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Does better disease management in primary care reduce 
hospital costs? Evidence from English primary care 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We apply cross-sectional and panel data methods to a database of 5 million patients in 8,000 
English general practices to examine whether better primary care management of 10 chronic 
diseases is associated with reduced hospital costs. We find that only primary care 
performance in stroke care is associated with lower hospital costs.   Our results suggest that 
the 10% improvement in the general practice quality of stroke care between 2004/5 and 
2007/8 reduced 2007/8 hospital expenditure by about £130 million in England.  The cost 
savings are due mainly to reductions in emergency admissions and outpatient visits, rather 
than to lower costs for patients treated in hospital or to reductions in elective admissions.  
 
Keywords: Quality.  Disease management. Primary care.  Hospital costs.  Ambulatory care 
sensitive conditions. Preventative care. 
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Does better disease management in primary care reduce 
hospital costs? Evidence from English primary care 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
There is a widespread belief and hope amongst policymakers that timely disease 
management, in the form of encouraging behavioural change, self care by patients, and 
preventive medicine, can reduce demands for healthcare expenditure and improve health 
outcomes (HSCIC, 2005). The intention of disease management is to ensure that ‘at risk’ 
groups, or those with established chronic conditions, receive clinical best practice in the 
monitoring of their condition, and that recognized intermediate outcomes are achieved to 
reduce the risk of acute health deterioration. The hope is that better management of existing 
conditions and the reduction in the risk of serious complications will improve patients’ health 
prospects, and reduce expected future health services expenditure (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2004). 
 
The research evidence is however equivocal (Congressional Budget Office, 2004). Most 
preventive interventions are cost-increasing, and many are not even cost-effective when 
compared to more conventional clinical interventions. Less than 20% of studies have 
identified cost-saving preventive interventions (Russell, 2009). A recent review of the 
economic impact of disease management programs for diabetes, depression, heart failure and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) found that only half of studies reported cost 
savings, mainly through reduced hospital admissions and specialist visits (de Bruin, 2011).   
The cost-effectiveness of disease management is therefore a critical issue. As summarized by 
Cohen et al (2008), “careful analysis of the costs and benefits of specific interventions, rather 
than broad generalizations, is critical.” In other words, it is likely that the precise population 
groups targeted, and the frequency and mode of implementation will be crucial determinants 
of an intervention’s impact on health and health service costs. 
 
In an attempt to improve the quality of disease management in primary care, pay for 
performance schemes have been introduced in several countries: Australia (Scott et al, 2009), 
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Italy (Bruni et al, 2009), Taiwan (Lee et al, 2010), the United States (Lester et al, 2010) and 
the United Kingdom (Roland, 2004; Doran et al, 2006). Since 2004, UK general practitioners 
(GPs) have been subject to a major ‘pay for performance’ incentive scheme, known as the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF).  The introduction of QOF was part of the new 
contract for the delivery of primary care.  The contract came with considerable additional 
funding for general practices, and expenditure on primary care in England increased from 
£5.8 billion in 2003/04 to £7.8 billion in 2005/06.  Under the QOF, about 20% of GP income 
was determined by practice achievement against quality indicators (National Audit Office, 
2008).  The QOF is probably the most radical attempt to date to embed preventive medicine 
and disease management into primary care and has a large number of indicators of disease 
management quality. Given the substantial additional funding provided to support the QOF, 
policymakers will want to determine whether those practices that record a better performance 
against QOF indicators reduce the costs patients incur in other parts of the health system. 
 
A number of studies have used the detailed measures of disease management produced by the 
QOF to examine the association between practice quality scores and hospital admissions 
(Downing et al, 2007; Shohet et al, 2007; Bottle et al, 2008a; Bottle et al, 2008b; Kiran et al., 
2010; Purdy, 2011;  Bankart et al, 2010 Calderón-Larrañaga A et al , 2011 ). They have 
found only a weak negative, and usually statistically insignificant, association. This might be 
due to the ineffective nature of the incentivized interventions. However, it could also be due 
to the use of aggregate geographic level data, or a relatively small samples of practices, to the 
use of a single year of data, to other data limitations, or to the characteristics of the pay-for-
performance scheme (for example, the QOF quality indicators have upper achievement 
thresholds of between 50% and 90% so that practices can score the maximum number of 
points without achieving the target for all patients). 
 
Dusheiko et al (2010) avoid many of these problems in their analysis of practice emergency 
hospital admission rates for short term complications of diabetes using data on all English 
practices from 2004/5 to 2006/7.  They find that moving 10% of registered diabetic patients 
from poor to good glycaemic control in an average practice was associated with a 14% 
decrease in the rate of emergency admissions for short term diabetic complications, and a 
£1,928 reduction in hospital costs per practice in 2006/7.  However, their study was at 
practice level and was not able to allow for the characteristics of individual patients in 
practices.   
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Some studies have directly investigated the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives 
for quality in primary care on hospital admissions and costs. Mullen et al. (2010) found that 
although P4P for a range of clinical quality measures in California had a positive impact on 
some of the clinical measures rewarded by the programs, there was no significant effect on 
avoidable hospital admissions.  Lee et al. (2010) reported that diabetes related examinations 
and physician visits increased for patients enrolled in a P4P disease management program in 
Taiwan compared with diabetic patients not enrolled in any P4P program, while inpatient 
admissions and diabetes related hospitalizations and expenditure fell significantly by 12% 
and 35%.  Chen et al. (2010) investigated the impact of P4P for quality of care for diabetic 
patients in Hawaii. Patients who saw P4P-participating physicians were significantly more 
likely to receive better quality care compared with patients who saw non–P4P-participating 
physicians and improvements in care were associated with significant reductions in 
hospitalization.  Fiorentini et al (2010) found the incentives for quality in primary care 
reduced related avoidable hospitalizations in the Emilia-Romagna region.  
 
We take advantage of a major new database of hospital records for over 50 million English 
citizens linked to disease management quality indicators for their general practice to examine 
the association between quality of disease management in general practice and hospital costs.  
We are able improve on previous studies by using QOF data for a longer time period (2004/5 
to 2007/8), and by having detailed information on the diagnostic history of individuals. The 
database also enabled us to examine the impact of disease management on the total hospital 
costs for individuals as well as their costs relating to unplanned admissions, specialist visits 
and planned hospital treatments. 1   
 
Section 2 discusses how general practice disease management may affect hospital costs and 
describes the estimation methods used to detect these effects.  Section 3 describes the dataset 
and section 4 the estimation methods.  Section 5 has the results and section 6 presents some 
concluding remarks. 
   
                                                 
1 We do not attempt to estimate the effects of the QOF scheme on quality or on hospital costs since we have no 
information of pre QOF quality.   
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2 General practice disease management and hospital cost  
 
Disease management of chronic conditions in general practice is intended to improve the 
health of individual patients with chronic conditions via monitoring (for example, cholesterol 
levels for patients with coronary heart disease), preventive medicine (for example anti-
platelet therapy for stroke patients, influenza immunization for vulnerable groups), and 
lifestyle advice for smokers or the obese.  A general practice’s disease management could 
affect hospital costs for its patients in a variety of ways.  Patients incur hospital costs via 
emergency admissions, elective admissions and outpatient visits.  Better disease management 
by a general practice could alter the probabilities of these three types of use and/or the costs 
incurred if a patient uses hospital services. 
 
Ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs) are medical conditions for which adverse 
outcomes such as emergency hospital admission may be reduced by better management in 
primary care (AHRQ, 2004).   Purdy et al (2009) estimate that a set of 19 ACSCs commonly 
used to monitor aspects of National Health Service (NHS) performance accounted for 14.1% 
of NHS emergency admissions in England in 2005/6 and a larger set of 36 ACSCs accounted 
for 40.1%.   Thus we would expect that practices with better disease management of ACSCs 
would have fewer patients being admitted as emergencies for complications of ACSCs.  
However, it is possible that over-zealous management of some ACSCs in general practice 
could increase certain types of emergency admissions.  For example, disease management of 
diabetic patients is aimed at reducing blood sugar levels and should therefore reduce 
emergency admissions for acute hyperglycaemic  complications.  But excessively aggressive 
management of blood sugar can increase the risk of admissions for hypoglycaemic  coma 
(Briscoe and Davis, 2006). The targeting of patients with specified chronic conditions may 
also divert GP efforts away from other types of patients and increase their risk of 
hospitalization.   On balance it is likely that better general practice disease management is 
associated with lower emergency admission probabilities, though there is no evidence on the 
overall magnitude of the association.  
 
It is also possible that better general practice disease management will reduce costs for 
patients who are hospitalized as emergencies if such patients are healthier, though still ill, 
when admitted. Moreover, some of the investments that practices make to improve disease 
management, such as better record systems, employing specialist nurses, and better liaison 
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with community health staff, will also enable their patients to be discharged earlier because 
aftercare arrangements are better.   
 
The effect of better practice disease management on the costs of elective hospitalizations is 
less clear.  Some elective hospitalizations are for the treatment of patients whose chronic 
conditions are more severe. For example, patients with heart disease requiring CABGs or 
PTCAs are usually admitted as elective patients, as are diabetic patients with ophthalmic 
complications. If better disease management reduces the probability of the disease 
progressing to the stage where such procedures are required then elective admissions will be 
reduced.  On the other hand better disease management can increase the probability that 
patients with chronic conditions are admitted for unrelated elective procedures such as 
cataracts or hip replacements, either because they survive long enough to require such 
procedures or because patients with better controlled chronic conditions will have greater 
health gains from such procedures and may therefore be more likely to receive them. 
Improved monitoring of patients with chronic conditions may result in earlier detection of 
other conditions requiring treatment.  Again, as with emergency admissions, if general 
practice disease management means that admitted elective patients are healthier, the costs of 
admitted patients may be lower because they are likely to develop fewer complications and to 
have shorter lengths of stay. 
 
The use of outpatient departments by a practice’s patients may also be affected by its disease 
management.  Of the 60 million annual outpatient visits in England, around 20 million are for 
new patients referred by their GP.  More active case finding may lead to GPs referring more 
patients to hospital outpatient departments for further testing and diagnosis.  GPs may also 
refer more patients for elective procedures and the first step in this process is a referral to an 
outpatient department for a specialist to agree that the patient should receive the treatment. 
On the other hand elective or emergency admissions will often lead to follow up outpatient 
visits, and if better disease management leads to fewer inpatient stays then follow up 
outpatient visits will also decline. 
 
Thus, in addition to examining the effect of disease management on a patient’s total hospital 
costs, it will of interest to examine its effects on the differing types of hospital cost (arising 
from emergency admissions, elective admissions, and outpatient visits) and to decompose 
these effects into those due to variations in the probability of use and those due to variations 
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in the intensity of use (costs of those who use the hospital).   Moreover, it may also be 
necessary to allow for the fact that different effects of primary care disease management may 
occur with differing time lags. For example better control of diabetic patients’ blood sugar 
will have a rapid effect on emergency admissions for hyperglycaemic complications. But 
better monitoring of their peripheral pulses will take some years to reduce the likelihood of 
admissions for long term neuropathological complications leading to lower limb amputations.   
Section 4 describes how we model these various effects in the light of the available data. 
 
3 Data 
 
We link two individual level and one practice level administrative databases to small area 
socio-economic and demographic data.  In the English National Health Service patients who 
wish to obtain publicly funded NHS primary care services from general practitioners (GPs) 
must register with a single general practice.  We had information on all patients (over 50 
million) who were registered with an English practice at any time between 1 April 2001 and 1 
April 2008.  We also had information on all hospital inpatient episodes and outpatient visits 
for all patients admitted to English NHS hospitals for the same period.2  We linked the 
practice registration data to hospital data at individual patient level using pseudonymized 
NHS numbers.   We then attached measures of the quality of disease management in their 
practices to the patients. Finally, we attached a large set of socio-economic and supply side 
variables to the individuals based on either their small area of residence or their general 
practice. 
 
For analysis we took a 10% random sample of patients in each English practice that had at 
least 1000 patients, yielding about 5 million observations per year.3   
 
3.1 Hospital expenditure 
For our models of patient cost the dependent variable is individual patient annual NHS 
hospital expenditure.4 We include expenditure on both outpatient attendances and all inpatient 
                                                 
2 Some patients of English practices are treated in hospitals located in Wales and Scotland.  Previous work has 
shown that dropping the small number of patients in practices near to the borders with Wales and Scotland 
makes no difference to estimation results (Dixon et al, 2009).  
3 Sutton et al (2007) report that a sample size of about 5 million individuals is sufficient to generate stable 
parameter estimates. 
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hospital spells finishing in that year whether they started in the year or the previous year.  We 
used the same set of unit costs obtained from the English Department of Health to cost spells 
in each of the years 2004/5 to 2007/8. We exclude costs for maternity from the calculation of 
total hospital costs since maternity costs are unlikely to be affected by chronic disease 
management.  We also exclude mental health costs because of doubts about the quality of the 
hospital expenditure data for mental health.  For 2007/8 31% of our sample record a non-zero 
hospital cost with the average cost of these patients being £1,383.  The average cost across all 
patients in our sample for 2007/8 is £427.  See Table 1 where we also present summary 
statistics for average costs and probabilities of use for emergency admissions, elective 
admissions and outpatient visits.  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
3.2 Practice disease management quality 
We measure practice disease management quality using data from the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF), a P4P scheme covering all practices in the UK that was introduced in 
April 2004 (National Audit Office, 2008). Because of the difficulty of attributing health 
outcomes to specific activities in a general practice, the QOF ties incentive payments mainly 
to process activities over which GPs have direct control and for which there is evidence of 
subsequent benefits to the patient (Doran, 2008; Roland, 2004).  The QOF was expected to 
lead to a reduction in avoidable hospital admissions by stimulating an improvement in 
chronic disease management (HSCIC, 2005, p2). We use the very rich practice level data 
extracted automatically from general practice electronic records to construct practice level 
measures of the quality of disease management in 10 disease areas.   
 
There were some revisions to the QOF in 2006/7 but its basic structure remained intact over 
the study period.5 In the revised version there were 136 performance indicators grouped in 
four domains: clinical (80 indicators), organizational (43 indicators), patient experience (5 
indicators), and additional services (8 indicators).  Practices scored points for their 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Financial years run from 1 April to 31 March.  Hospital data are available at  http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/. 
We exclude the costs of patients treated privately in NHS hospitals and include the costs of patients in private 
hospitals who were paid for by the NHS.  
5 The 2004/5 QOF had 1050 points for 146 indicators, with 76 clinical indicators in 11 disease areas accounting 
for 550 points (Department of Health, 2004). 
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achievement against each indicator, with the maximum number of points available varying 
across indicators.  In total a general practice could earn up to 1,000 points, each point worth 
£125 for an average practice. 675 of the points were for the 80 clinical indicators that covered 
19 groups of conditions.  QOF clinical quality determined about 10% of GP income. 
 
We use the clinical domain indicators to measure practice disease management quality.  We 
ignore the organizational indicators because they are unlikely to have a direct effect on 
hospital expenditure and would most likely influence expenditure only through their impact 
on the clinical domain indicators.  The clinical indicators generally measured regularity of 
monitoring (for example, whether a diabetic patient's blood pressure or cholesterol had been 
recorded in the last 15 months) and intermediate outcomes, such as whether blood pressure 
had been successfully controlled. Practices were awarded points according to the proportion 
of eligible patients for whom each target was met, with points increasing linearly between a 
lower threshold of 40%6 up to an upper threshold that varied across indicators.  See Table 2 
for examples of indicators for practice care of stroke patients. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Setting upper thresholds below 100% of maximum attainment was intended to reduce the risk 
that GPs would inappropriately treat some patients (Roland, 2004; Doran et al 2008). 
However, the upper threshold might also discourage practices from including the most hard-
to-reach patients because no further points are received when a practice has achieved the 
upper threshold (National Audit Office, 2008, p36). 
 
Most of the clinical indicators are expressed as percentages of the eligible population, an 
approach designed to encourage practices to increase the number of treated patients from the 
appropriate set of patients. However, the eligible population for an indicator is not the 
number of patients with the disease (prevalence - which we denote P).  Practices are able to 
exclude some patients from the denominator by designating them as ‘exceptions’ according 
to specified criteria.  Exception reporting is intended to avoid penalising practices where, for 
example, patients do not attend for review, or where a medication cannot be prescribed due to 
a contraindication or side-effect.  Thus the reported achievement used to calculate financial 
                                                 
6 Except for the DEMENTIA 2 indicator where the lower threshold was 25%. 
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rewards for a clinical indicator is N/(P−E) where N is the number for whom the indicator is 
achieved and E is the number exception reported for that indicator. 
 
Practices could increase their reported achievement, and hence their financial rewards, by 
overstating exceptions. There is some evidence that practices did so (Doran et al, 2008; 
Gravelle, Sutton and Ma; 2010).  Thus the reported achievement rate is not an appropriate 
quality indicator.  Using the actual points earned by the practice would also be questionable 
because the upper thresholds for earning points means that, for example, two practices with 
reported achievements of 60% and 90% on the Stroke 8 indicator would get the same number 
of points (see Table 2).   
 
In this paper we therefore measure quality by the population achievement rates calculated as 
N/P (i.e. not adjusted for exceptions), though, as we note in the results section, measuring 
quality by reported achievement (N/(P−E)) makes no substantive difference.  For each 
disease domain we calculate the domain population achievement as a weighted average of the 
population achievement rates on the indicators in that domain.  The weight attached to an 
indicator is the share of the maximum points that it attracts in the relevant clinical domain.7   
 
Some indicators refer to a subset of patients in a disease area and there is no information on 
the number of patients in these subsets to enable us to calculate our quality measure.  We 
therefore base our quality measures only on indicators that refer to all patients with a disease 
(Doran et al, 2006) For 2007/8 ee use 48 clinical quality indicators to calculate overall quality 
measures for the 10 disease areas shown in Table 3 that cover most of the major chronic 
conditions encountered in general practice. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Table 4 has summary statistics for 2007/8 for our quality measures for the ten clinical disease 
areas and Table 5 reports their correlation coefficients. Although the rates are positively 
correlated, many of the correlations are modest, suggesting considerable variations in levels 
of attainment within a practice across different domains. The mental health achievement rate 
                                                 
7 For details of the construction of the population achievement rates see Doran et al (2006). 
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is the least well correlated with the other sub-domains. Correlations for other years are 
similar.  
 
<Tables 4 and 5 about here> 
3.3 Covariates 
We use three sets of covariates: individual needs variables, small area needs variables and 
indicators of supply.8  The individual needs variables are: 
(a) age (5 year bands) at the beginning of the financial year and gender (38 age/gender band 
dummies). 
(b) previous morbidity for each individual as measured by 152 dummy variables based on 
ICD10 inpatient diagnosis categories used by the NHS Information Centre.9  The dummy for 
a morbidity category was set equal to 1 if the individual had one or more hospital spells in 
either of the previous two years with any diagnosis in the relevant subset of ICD10 
categories.10    
(c) four hospital encounter variables (the number of inpatient episodes in the previous two 
years, the number of outpatient attendances in the previous two years, and two dummy 
variables indicating whether the individual had a priority outpatient referral or received any 
treatment in the course of an outpatient attendance in the previous two years).  The rationale 
is that the number of times an individual has been admitted to hospital or attended an 
outpatient clinic in the past conveys something about the intensity of their morbidity 
experience, over and above the information contained in the binary ICD10 morbidity 
variables, which do not reflect repeated spells in the same ICD10 category.  
(d) two indicators for whether the individual patient had a private inpatient spell or a private 
outpatient attendance in an NHS hospital in the previous two years.  Our expenditure measure 
is for costs borne by the NHS. Some patients treated in NHS hospitals choose to pay to be 
treated as private patients to reduce their waiting times or to be able to choose their surgeon.  
Individuals who have been private patients in the past are more likely to use private provision 
in the future, and will therefore other things equal incur less NHS expenditure.  
 
                                                 
8 These variables are more fully described in PBRA Team (2010). 
9 See http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/Ease/servlet/ContentServer?siteID=1937&categoryID=202. 
10 The morbidity indicators do not indicate severity of the condition, merely its presence or absence.  It would be 
useful in future work to include more refined measures of mobidity for particular conditions from data sets 
based on practice clinical records. 
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For the attributed (small area) needs variables we had over 160 small area level measures of 
population socio-economic characteristics that might plausibly be linked to variations in 
hospital utilization. These included data from the 2001 Census and the Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation 2007 that were attributed to each individual via their Lower Super Output Area 
of residence.11  We also had information on disease prevalence rates for each practice derived 
from the rates reported by practices as part of the QOF.   
 
The attributed supply variables included over 90 measures of local health system 
characteristics that might affect hospital utilization. They included practice characteristics 
such as the number of patients per GP and measures of the accessibility of different types of 
health care facilities from the small area in which the patient lives.  The supply variables also 
included measures of accessibility such as distance to providers and waiting times at local 
hospitals. 
 
We also included 151 dummy variables for the Primary Care Trust (PCT) responsible for the 
general practice with which the individual is registered.  PCTs were the administrative entity 
with prime responsibility for purchasing NHS services from local hospitals on behalf of their 
local populations, typically about 350,000 individuals. The dummies are intended to capture 
factors such as variations in aggregate PCT spending levels and PCT commissioning policies 
that may affect hospital costs.  Because patients in many PCTs tend to use one main hospital 
provider the PCT dummies will also pick up variations in hospital diagnosis recording 
practices, and hospital treatment thresholds.12  
 
4  Estimation  
 
Given the large samples of data together with the extensive set of covariates to be considered, 
we adopt a pragmatic approach, starting with cross-sectional models for exploratory analyses 
and building up to dynamic panel data models. The cross-sectional models allow us to 
explore specification of models that capture the impact of practice quality on hospital costs 
while controlling for confounding factors. They also allow us to investigate the impact of 
                                                 
11 See http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/.    There are  32,482 lower super output areas 
(LSOAs) with a minimum population of 997 and a mean population of 1,513. 
12 We also estimated models using the proportion of a practice’s expenditure incurred at each hospital in 
England to control for hospital effects with very similar results. 
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different practice quality measures and the lag between quality and hospital costs. The impact 
of quality is then explored separately for total costs (zero and positive expenditures) arising 
from emergency admission, elective admissions and outpatient visits. We then consider the 
impact of disease management on the probability of incurring hospital expenditure and 
separately on the level of costs conditional on having incurred expenditures (positive 
expenditures only). Finally, we estimate dynamic panel data models of total hospital costs 
controlling for persistence in individual expenditures and heterogeneity in practice effects 
brought about, for example, by differences in referral decisions.  
 
The distribution of total hospital costs for individuals generally has a spike at zero and a long 
right-hand tail. They also tend to be heteroskedastic. In small to moderate samples these 
characteristics can be challenging to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and alternatives 
including generalized linear models and ordinary least squares on a transformed dependent 
variable are often used (e.g. Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004; Manning et a;, 2005).  For the 
dataset used in this study the performance of alternative estimators was investigated in depth 
and it was found that, because of the very large sample sizes available, OLS models of 
untransformed expenditure outperformed alternatives in terms of predictive power (Dixon et 
al, 2009). This is in line with findings from other researchers using large samples (Dunn et al, 
2003, Ellis and McGuire, 2007).  Accordingly, when modelling the level of costs we estimate 
linear specifications using OLS (and panel data counterparts) in what follows.  
 
4.1 Cross section models 
We first estimate cross section models of total hospital costs  
 0ijp jp q ijp x ijp m ijp n ijp v ijp sc q x m n v sβ β β β β β β′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + + + + + p PCT ijpPCT β ε′+ +             (1) 
where ܿ௜௝௣ is expenditure in the financial year 2007/08 on patient i in practice j in PCT p on 1 
April 2007. q is a vector of measures of general practice disease management quality, x is a 
vector of 37 age and gender dummies. m is a vector of 152 morbidity indicators based on 
ICD10 diagnoses for inpatient episodes and v vector of 4 encounter variables, with both 
vectors based on data from the previous two years.  n is vector of small area needs variables 
attributed to individuals on the basis of their place of residence and s a vector of supply 
variables based on practice characteristics and accessibility of health care facilities (all as of 1 
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April 2007). PCT is a vector of 151 PCT dummy variables and ε  is an error term. The model 
is estimated via OLS using practice cluster robust standard errors.  
 
We retained vectors of individual characteristics x, m and v in all specifications. However, the 
initial model had over 500 potential explanatory variables including 250 attributed needs and 
supply characteristics (n, v, s). To search for a parsimonious specification of the attributed 
variables these latter variables we start from a full model (containing all variables) and 
eliminate attributed variables on the basis of their t statistics.  We first drop attributed 
variables with |t| < 0.2 and re-estimate and drop attributed variables with |t| < 0.4.  We repeat 
increasing the required absolute t statistic until all remaining attributed variables have |t| ≥ 
2.00.  We then drop attributed variables with counter-intuitive signs, and re-estimate the 
models. We repeat these steps until only those attributed variables with a significance level of 
1% or better. The resulting model is then used as the basis for investigating the impact of 
quality measures on hospital costs.   
 
We next estimate probit cross-section models of the probability of incurring hospital 
expenditure in 2007/8 ( )Pr ijpy , where yijp = 1 if cijp > 0 and yijp = 0 otherwise, with practice 
cluster robust standard errors.  We also estimate OLS cross section models for individuals 
with positive expenditure cijp > 0, again with practice cluster robust standard errors.   We use 
the set of regressors selected in the final parsimonious version of  (1).   
 
4.2  Panel data models 
We extend the cross-sectional analysis to exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data and 
estimate panel data models for 2004/5 to 2007/8  
 0ijpt jpt q ijpt x ijpt m ijpt n ijpt v ijpt sc q x m n v sβ β β β β β β′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + + + + +     
       2p PCT t jp ijptPCT β ϕ μ ε′+ + + +   (2) 
ϕt is a year effect, μjp is a practice-specific time invariant error term and ε2ijpt is a time and 
individual pooled error term.  Note that the pooled error term could be decomposed into an 
unobserved individual specific effect and an idiosyncratic error term: ε2ijpt = αijp + ζijpt. 
However, due to computational constraints of estimating three-way error-component panel 
data models with such a large set of variables and observations we pool these two 
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components of the error.  This is unlikely to be overly restrictive given that variability in the 
quality measures occurs across time and practices and not across individuals within practices.  
 
First we estimate (2) assuming, separately, that the μjp are fixed and random practice effects. 
We then use a dynamic specification by including an autoregressive one-period lag of the 
expenditure variable to reflect persistence, or state dependence, in the use of health care not 
fully reflected through the set of morbidity and encounter variables: 
 0 1ijpt jpt q ijpt x ijpt m ijpt n ijpt v ijpt s ijptc q x m n v s cβ β β β β β β γ −′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + + + + + +     
       2p PCT t jp ijptPCT β ϕ μ ε′+ + + +   (3) 
Persistence in health expenditures is captured through the parameter  .  For example, should 
an individual experience a shock to health (via ε2ijpt) resulting in higher hospital expenditure 
in period t, then γˆ > 0 will imply that health care expenditures will be higher in future 
periods.  
 
To derive consistent estimates of the parameters of (3) we need to allow for the correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable cijpt-1 and the error ε2ijpt and in particular via an 
unobserved individual effect ie ε2ijpt =αijp + ζijpt. In the context of models with discrete 
outcomes this is often referred to as the problem of initial conditions (Heckman, 1981). 
Wooldridge (2002) proposes an approach to deal with the initial conditions problem intended 
for non-linear dynamic random effects panel data models. It involves modelling the 
distribution of the unobserved effect conditional on the initial value of the dependent variable 
(first wave observation) and any exogenous explanatory variables (see Contoyannis et al. 
(2004) for an application). Following the spirit of this approach but adapting to our linear 
model we parameterise the unobserved individual effect as follows:   
 2 0 1 1 2ijp ijp ijp ijpc zα κ κ κ ε′= + + +        (4) 
where ijpz is a vector of the average values over time within individuals of the exogenous 
variables (x,m,n,s).  εijp is an error term assumed to be independent of ijpz′ , q, the initial 
condition cijp1 and the residual pooled error term (ε2ijpt − α2ijp).  Substituting (4) into (3) gives 
a model with regressors at time t augmented to include cijp1 (costs in year 2004/5) and ijpz . 
This model can then be estimated using random practice effects.  Note that we would expect 
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the coefficient 1κˆ  to be positive as it is informative about the relationship between the 
individual unobserved effect and initial hospital expenditures.  
 
Blundell, et al. (2002) suggest modelling individual heterogeneity in dynamic count data 
models as a function of baseline or pre-sample averages of the dependent variable and show 
this to perform well in simulations.  To further control for practice level heterogeneity we 
adapt this approach by averaging individual baseline costs cijp1 across individuals within 
practices to construct a variable representing practice baseline costs based on data from the 
initial period 2004/5. In a similar way to the augmented regression in (4), this constructed 
variable 1jpc  can used as a regressor in the parameterization of the unobserved practice effect 
as 0 1 1jp jp jpcμ τ τ ε= + + .  
 
5 Results  
 
5.1 Cross-section models for 2007/8 total cost 
Although our final parsimonious model contained only five of the 250 attributed needs and 
supply variables, there was only a small loss in explanatory power compared with the initial 
model with a full set of covariates (the 2R fell from 0.2662 to 0.2654).  The signs and 
coefficients on the covariates from the parsimonious model are generally plausible.13  The 
variables that make the largest contribution to explanatory power are the 152 past morbidity 
indicators and the age/gender categories.  Unsurprisingly, individuals with past morbidity 
generally have higher costs.  Costs for both males and females decrease with age until 25 
years and then increase (see Appendix Table A1).  There is no hump at child bearing age for 
women because maternity costs are excluded from the total cost dependent variable.     
 
The coefficients on the four hospital encounter variables are significant and positive. They 
imply that, for example, the number of times an individual has been admitted to hospital or 
attended outpatients in the past conveys something about the intensity of their morbidity 
experience, over and above the information contained in the binary ICD10 morbidity 
                                                 
13 Appendix Table A1 reports coefficients on age/gender, past hospital use, and attributed needs and supply 
variables for the main cross-section and panel data models. The complete set of coefficients (including the 
individual past morbidity dummies and PCT dummies) are in the working paper Dushieko et al (2011).  
 19
variables. The two private health care variables have a negative effect on NHS costs. This is 
as expected since individuals who have been private patients in the past are more likely to use 
private facilities in the future when they are ill and thus will generate lower NHS expenditure.  
The five attributed small areas needs variables that are significant in the final parsimonious 
model have plausible signs but make a very small contribution to explanatory power of the 
model because of the presence of the individual level past morbidity variables and the 
age/gender coefficients.  
 
Our focus is on the ten disease management quality measures for general practices.  Only the 
measure for stroke care quality is statistically significant with a coefficient of −0.664 (Table 
6, model 1).14 We also estimated the cross-section parsimonious model for 2007/8 costs, 
replacing the current QOF stroke score for 2007/8 with the stroke score for previous years 
(models 2 to 4 in Table 6).  The estimated effect of lagged quality on 2007/8 expenditure is 
smaller the greater the lag, falling from −0.664 for current stroke quality to −0.322 for 2004/5 
stroke quality.15  
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
We undertook robustness checks by forcing the other nine QOF quality measures into 
models. Model 1 in Table 7 shows the coefficients on the disease domain quality measures 
when all ten are included in the regression.  Three of the coefficients are positive, though not 
statistically significant, six are negative and statistically insignificant, and only the stroke 
quality measure is negative and significant.  The estimated effect of stroke quality in this 
model is very similar to its effect when the nine insignificant quality measures are dropped 
(model 1, Table 6).    
 
<Table 7 about here> 
 
                                                 
14 The coefficient on stroke care quality was robust to the nesting down process. The coefficient in the full 
model with all 250 attributed needs and supply variables was −0.565 (t: −2.23). 
15 Most of the indicators in the clinical domains reflect practice achievement in the 15 months to the financial 
year end (that is, the QOF indicators for 2007/8 reflect practice achievement from January 2007 to March 2008).  
This will be slightly (three months) behind of the cost variable which relates to inpatient episodes and outpatient 
attendances finishing between April 2007 and March 2008.   
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We also computed an aggregate quality measure as the weighted average of the 10 disease 
domain measures and found that it is negative and significant when it is included as the only 
QOF quality measure (Table 7, model 2).  The coefficient on the aggregate measure is very 
similar to that on the stroke score in the earlier model.   Finally, we estimated 10 separate 
models for total hospital cost forcing one of the 10 quality measures into each model.  The 
coefficients from on the quality measures from these 10 separate models are reported in 
column 3 of Table 7. Four quality measures (asthma, chronic heart disease, diabetes, 
hypothyroidism) are separately significantly negatively associated with expenditure but the 
coefficients are smaller and less precise than that on stroke care quality.16 
 
In the light of the consistent results from the simple cross-section models we decided to 
restrict attention in more sophisticated models to the effects of stroke care quality and to use 
the same parsimonious specification.  
5.2 Two part cross section models 
Table 8 reports estimates of two part models for all hospital expenditures, and for expenditure 
disaggregated for emergency, elective and outpatient attendances. Higher quality stroke care 
was significantly associated with a lower probability of any hospital expenditure and reduced 
hospital expenditure conditional on incurring any expenditure. A 1% increase in quality was 
associated with a decrease in the probability of positive expenditures of 0.0002 against a 
mean probability of 0.309 (elasticity −0.05).  A 1% improvement in stroke care quality was 
associated with a £2 reduction in total hospital costs (elasticity −0.12) for those with any 
costs.  We also ran a two part model with log costs and the stroke quality coefficient was 
−0.0009 (SE 0.0002).   
 
<Table 8 about here> 
 
                                                 
16 We also estimated models with the quality measure constructed using patients reported eligible by the practice 
P−E, rather than those with the disease P (see section 3.2). For the cross section model the coefficient on the 
stroke quality measure is reduced slightly from −0.644 (SE 0.190) to −0.602 (SE 0.219).The reduction in the 
estimated coefficient is probably because removing exceptions from the denominator in the quality measure is 
akin to a rescaling which increases the magnitude of the explanatory variable and hence reduces the magnitude 
of the coefficient. We also ran models including measures of the share of each practice’s admissions at each 
hospital. The stroke coefficient was again reduced slightly −0.609 (SE 0.219).  We tested for robustness to 
estimation methods by running a cross section GLM model with a log link and gamma distribution for total 
hospital costs.  The coefficient on the stroke quality score was again negative and significant −0.0016 (SE 
0.0005). 
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Higher quality was associated with significantly lower emergency and outpatient visit 
expenditures, but not with elective costs. The reduction in emergency expenditures was 
driven by a significant reduction in the probability of admission. A 1% improvement in 
stroke quality was associated with a 0.00007 decrease in the probability of emergency 
admission (elasticity −0.11). There was a negative but insignificant association with 
emergency expenditure conditional on the patient being admitted. The significant decrease in 
outpatient expenditures was due to significant reductions in both the probability of a visit 
(elasticity −0.51) and the cost of visits conditional on any outpatient expenditure (elasticity 
−0.01).    
 
5.3 Panel data models 
Results of panel data estimates are presented in Table 9.17  Column 1 presents results from a 
fixed practice effects model.18 This estimator controls for unobserved practice-level effects 
correlated with both quality and expenditure. It relies on variation in QOF scores within 
practices over time to identify the impact of quality on costs.  The estimate of the effect of 
stroke quality is negative (−0.091), a great deal smaller than the corresponding cross-
sectional estimate (Table 8, column 1) and not significant. This is likely to reflect the relative 
lack of variation in practice QOF scores over time compared to the cross-sectional model 
estimate where the impact of quality is identified through variation across practices. The 
discrepancy may also reflect the bias in the cross-sectional estimates due to correlation 
between unobserved practice heterogeneity associated with quality of care and patient costs.    
 
<Table 9 about here> 
 
Column 2 is the corresponding random effects specification with a practice-specific error 
component.  The coefficient on the stroke QOF score (−0.193) is smaller than the cross-
                                                 
17 For the panel models, a 10% sample of patients registered with each general practice with a list size of at least 
1000 at 1 April 2004 was selected (n=5,131,161), and  practice registration details along with the LSOA of 
residence were added for these patients as at 1 April 2005,  1 April 2006, and 1 April 2007.  The panel sample 
thus excludes people born after 1 April 2004 but it includes patients alive at 1 April 2004 but who die at some 
point during the next four years.  
18 We further attempted individual fixed effects estimation. However, due to a lack of within individual 
variability in key variables of interest (notably the QOF score) from which to identify parameters, estimation 
yielded poor and imprecise estimates. 
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section estimate but larger than the fixed effects estimate in model 1 and is significant at the 
1% level.19  
 
Column 3 presents the results of the dynamic panel specification (3)  augmented with the 
individual effect specified as in (4).  The coefficient on the stroke QOF score is −0.266, 
which is greater than the corresponding coefficient in the random effects model and is 
significant at the 5% level. The model controls for individual heterogeneity in costs by 
directly allowing for persistence over time together with a random GP practice error 
component. The significant coefficient on lagged cost is 0.125, so a negative health shock 
that increases costs in one period will increase future costs but at a rapidly diminishing rate. 
The coefficient on the initial period individual cost is positive indicating the expected 
positive correlation between the unobserved individual-specific effects and costs.  
 
Column 4 has results from augmenting the dynamic panel model by including the baseline 
2004/5 mean practice cost to provide additional control for practice level heterogeneity. The 
absolute value of the coefficient on the practice stroke quality score decreases slightly to 
−0.255.  
 
We repeat the model in column 4 separately for emergency, elective and outpatient visit 
costs. The results confirm that the significant association between better quality of practice 
stroke care and hospital expenditure is driven primarily by prevention of emergency 
admission and subsequent specialist follow up care than by reductions in elective hospital 
treatments. The coefficient on lagged costs is much smaller for emergency cost than for 
outpatient and elective expenditures. suggesting that emergency costs are less persistent.20   
 
The mean practice stroke quality increased by ten percentage points between 2004/5 and 
2007/8.  The average practice population was 5700 so that the RE model dynamic model with 
baseline individual and mean practice costs (column 4, Table 9) suggests that the 
improvement in quality of care of stroke patients reduced annual expenditure on the patients 
of an average practice by £10*0.255*5700 = £14,535 (95% CI: -£1,464 -£27,606). 
                                                 
19 Using quality measures constructed with P−E rather than P (see section 3.2) for the random practice effects 
model (model 2 the coefficient is reduced to −0.152 (SE 0.082). 
20 The difference is not due to the relative magnitude of costs in these three categories as average emergency 
costs exceed average elective and outpatient costs.   
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Nationally, with an English population in 2007 of 51.1 million, the improvement in stroke 
care in general practice may have reduced 2007/8 hospital expenditure by £130million (95% 
CI: £13.1million −£247million) compared with 2004/5. The significant positive coefficient 
on one period lagged expenditure (0.125) implies that the total cost saving from a one off 
increase in  2007/8 stroke quality of 10%  which reduced total 2008/9 cost by £130 million  
should also include a reduction in 2008/9 expenditure of 0.125*£130million = £16 million.  
 
6 Conclusions 
 
This study has taken advantage of a major new data set that links practice-based patient 
registration data, patient level hospital use data, and GP practice clinical quality data to 
examine whether higher quality of disease management in primary care is associated with 
reduced hospital costs. Applying cross-section and panel data methods to a data set of 5 
million individuals, with a very rich set of covariates, we find that the current QOF stroke 
quality score almost always has a statistically significant negative association with patients' 
hospital costs in the same year.  Once stroke quality was allowed for, hospital costs were not 
affected by the quality of primary care disease management for any of the other nine 
conditions for which we had data.  
 
The reduction in total hospital expenditure associated with better quality of practice stroke 
care is due primarily to a reduction in the probability of emergency hospitalization and in 
outpatient visits.  There were negative but small and insignificant associations between 
quality and elective expenditure, which suggests that better monitoring of patients has not 
lead to increased costs arising from increased referrals by GPs to secondary care. Since we 
measure costs for all patients in practices, not just those whose disease management was 
incentivized under the QOF, our estimates allow for the possibility of diversion of preventive 
efforts in primary care away from other primary care patients. There was also significant 
persistence over time in secondary care medical costs indicating the longer term importance 
of better disease management.  There are weaker, but still statistically significant associations 
of 2007/8 hospital costs with general practice stroke quality in earlier years. The study 
demonstrates the importance of using panel data methods to control for unobserved patient 
and practice heterogeneity in non-randomized studies when assessing the impact of quality of 
care on patient outcomes.  
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Whilst we suggest a modest association between this aspect of primary care disease 
management and hospital costs, we so not claim that improved primary care will reduce 
lifetime health care costs. As is well-known, the majority of disease prevention strategies 
generate additional costs (Cohen et al, 2008). Our focus is solely on the annual impact on 
contemporaneous secondary care costs when there is an improvement in primary care 
prevention. We do not consider, for example, the £1 billion paid to general practices for their 
QOF achievements, nor the additional pharmaceutical and primary care costs associated with 
meeting QOF stroke targets, nor the impact on total lifetime healthcare costs if the patient 
lives longer as a result of better primary care.  Ideally a full evaluation would use measures of 
disease management quality for individuals rather than at the practice level as in this paper 
and would also incorporate data on morbidity from practice records, rather than from just 
from hospital records. A full evaluation of primary care disease management must also take 
account of its effect on the future time stream of health and on costs.  But the reduction in 
hospital costs due to better primary care disease management is part of the gains to be 
included in the evaluation.  
 
In summary, we are cautious about drawing inferences of causality from our analysis, but feel 
that the panel data results do offer solid grounds for believing that improvements in primary 
care disease management do not increase hospital costs, and that for at least some conditions, 
better management materially reduces hospital costs. 
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Table 1.  Costs and use for 2007/8 
 
  All hospital 
use 
Emergency 
inpatient 
Elective 
inpatient
Outpatient Other 
Average cost (sd) for all 
patients (£) 
427 
(2,067) 
150 
(1,086) 
144 
(1,338) 
119 
(451) 
14 
(410) 
Probability of positive cost 30.85% 5.54% 7.55% 28.74% 0.30% 
Average cost (sd) for patients 
with positive cost (£) 
1,383 
(3,539) 
2,707 
(3,791) 
1,904 
(4,513) 
414 
(765) 
4,710 
(5,818) 
Notes.  For random sample of 5,170,603 patients on lists of English practices with at least 1000 patients at 1 
April 2007.  Excludes maternity and mental health. The “Other” category includes patients transferred between 
hospitals and where the admission method is not known. 
 
 
 
Table 2.  QOF indicators used to construct measure of practice quality of care for 
stroke patients  
  Upper 
threshold 
Available 
points 
STROKE 5 % who have a record of blood pressure in the notes in 
the preceding 15 months 
90 2 
STROKE 6 % in whom the last blood pressure reading (measured 
in the last 15 months) is  150/90 or less 
70 5 
STROKE 7 % who have a record of total cholesterol in the last 15 
months 
90 2 
STROKE 8 % whose last measured total cholesterol (measured in 
the last 15 months) is 5 mmol/l or less 
60 5 
STROKE 10 % who have had influenza immunisation in the 
preceding 1 September to 31 March 
85 2 
STROKE 12 %who have a record that an anti-platelet agent 
(aspirin, clopidogrel, dipyridamole or a combination), 
or an anti-coagulant is being taken  (unless a 
contraindication or side-effects are recorded 
90 4 
Notes.  TIA: transient ischemic attack.  For '%' read 'the percentage of patients'.  Indicators Stroke 5 to Stroke 12 
have lower payment thresholds of 40%.   Source: NHS Employers (no date) .   
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Table 3.  Disease domains in the Quality and Outcomes Framework 2007/8 used to 
construct general practice disease management quality measures  
 
 Number of 
indicators in 
measure 
Total points 
available
 
Asthma 2 35
CHD 9 85
CKD 3 21
COPD 4 30
Dementia 1 15
Diabetes 15 87
Hypertension 2 77
Hypothyroidism 1 6
Mental health 5 35
Stroke 6 20
Total 48 411
Notes. Source: NHE Employers (no date).  CHD: coronary heart disease; CKD: chronic kidney disease; COPD: 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.  Note: not all indicators were used to construct our composite quality 
scores (see section 3 for further details).   
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for general practice disease management quality measures 
2007/8 
 
QOF quality measure Number of 
practices 
Weighted average population 
achievement (%) 
Mean SD Min Max 
Asthma  8289 76.38 9.11 0.00 100 
CHD  8284 82.74 3.85 35.00 100 
CKD  8251 97.68 2.57 50.00 100 
COPD  8279 81.97 8.61 0.00 100 
Dementia  8200 75.44 17.48 0.00 100 
Diabetes  8290 87.42 5.57 9.38 100 
Hypertension  8292 91.28 4.11 14.87 100 
Hypothyroidism  8281 95.37 3.78 9.09 100 
Mental health  8284 74.73 13.66 0.00 100 
Stroke  8276 86.17 5.77 6.67 100 
Notes: population achievement for an indicator i in disease domain k is defined as Nik/(Pk−Eik) where Nik is the 
number of patients for whom the indicator is achieved, Pk is the number of patients with the disease, Eik is the 
number of patients with the disease who are exception reported.  The quality measure for a disease domain is a 
weighted average of population achievement on each indicator in the domain, where the weights are the 
maximum points available for the indicator.   
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Table 5. Correlation coefficients for general practice disease management quality measures 2007/8   
 Asthma CHD CKD COPD Dementia Diabetes Hyper-
tension 
Hypo-
thyroidism
Mental 
Health 
CHD 0.349         
CKD 0.212 0.266       
COPD 0.356 0.485 0.194      
Dementia 0.257 0.216 0.129 0.226     
Diabetes 0.368 0.536 0.245 0.484 0.218    
Hypertension  0.406 0.476 0.336 0.373 0.229 0.489    
Hypothyroidism 0.272 0.368 0.210 0.296 0.179 0.400 0.455  
Mental Health 0.329 0.210 0.137 0.225 0.285 0.212 0.213 0.110
Stroke 0.343 0.607 0.301 0.466 0.225 0.530 0.484 0.371 0.234
Note: the number of practices is 8,178. 
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Table 6.  Association of general practice stroke management quality with 2007/8 
hospital expenditure: cross section models  
 
 1 2 3 4 
Stroke 2007/8  -0.664***    
 [0.190]    
Stroke 2006/7  -0.531***   
  [ 0.169]   
Stroke 2005/6   -0.460***  
   [ 0.145]  
Stroke 2004/5    -0.322** 
    [ 0.124] 
     
Observations 5170603 5170603 5170603 5166983 
R2 0.265  0.265  0.265  0.265 
Notes:  Dependent variable: patient hospital expenditure in 2007/8.  Reported coefficients are effect of a 1% 
increase in clinical population achievement in a patient’s practice on the patient’s hospital expenditure.  Robust 
standard errors in brackets with clustering by PCT. 
All models also contain 37 age/gender bands, 152 ICD10 morbidity dummies for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  4 hospital 
encounter variables for 2006/7, 2005/6, 2 private patient measures for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  5 attributed needs 
variables, 151 PCT dummies. See Sections 2 and 3 for details. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.  Association of 2007/8 general practice disease management quality measures 
with 2007/8 hospital costs   
 1  
All 
quality 
measures 
in single 
regression  
2 
Overall 
quality  
3 
Quality 
measures 
entered in 
separate 
regressions
Asthma -0.153  -0.241**
 [ 0.127]  [ 0.099] 
Coronary heart disease  -0.028  -0.637** 
 [ 0.385]  [0.297] 
Chronic kidney disease -0.013  -0.442 
 [0.437]  [0.395] 
COPD 0.099  -0.158 
 [0.180]  [0.152] 
Dementia -0.039  -0.090 
 [0.062]  [0.059] 
Diabetes 0.037  -0.374** 
 [0.237]  [0.182] 
Hypertension 0.462  -0.213 
 [0.376]  [0.251] 
Hypothyroidism -0.387  -0.657* 
 [0.438]  [0.372] 
Mental health -0.046  -0.115 
 [0.077]  [0.072] 
Stroke -0.666**  -0.664*** 
 [0.258]  [0.190] 
Overall quality  -0.698***  
  [0.236]  
    
Observations 5,170,603 5,170,603 5,170,603 
R2 [  0.265] [  0.265]  
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is 2007/8 hospital expenditure.  Reported coefficients are effect of a 1% 
increase in clinical population achievement in a patient’s practice on the patient’s hospital expenditure. Robust 
standard errors in brackets with clustering by PCT. All models are cross section and also contain 37 age/gender 
bands, 152 ICD10 morbidity dummies for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  4 hospital encounter variables for 2006/7, 
2005/6, 2 private patient measures for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  5 attributed needs variables, 151 PCT dummies. (See 
Sections 3 and 4 for details.)  All 10 models reported in column 3 had the same R2 of 0.265.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Association of general practice stroke management quality with costs and use for different types of hospital cost, 2007/8 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 _________All hospital use_______ ________Emergency admissions____ _______Elective admissions______  ________Outpatient visits_________ 
 Total cost 
(OLS) 
Part 1 
 Prob use 
(probit) 
Part 2  
Cost if use 
(OLS) 
Total cost 
(OLS) 
Part 1 
Prob  
admission 
(probit) 
Part 2 
Cost if 
admitted 
(OLS) 
Total cost 
(OLS) 
Part 1  
Prob 
admission 
(probit) 
Part 2 
Cost if 
admitted 
(OLS) 
Total cost 
(OLS) 
Part 1  
Prob visit 
(probit) 
Part 2  
Cost if visit 
(OLS) 
Stroke QOF 
score 
coefficient 
-0.664*** -0.00066** -1.996*** -0.319*** -0.00071*** -1.970 -0.089 -0.00042 -1.406 -0.164** -0.00061** -0.400** 
[0.190] [0.00026] [0.602] [0.096] [0.00026] [1.431] [0.113] [0.00027] [1.324] [0.063] [0.00026] [0.197] 
             
Av marginal 
effect 
 -0.00019**   -0.00007***   -0.000052   -0.0017**  
 [0.00007]   [0.000025]   [0.000034]   [0.00007]  
             
N 5,170,603 5,170,603 1,595,303 5,170,603 5,170,603 286,629 5,170,603 5,170,603 390,245 5,170,603 5,170,603 1,486,211 
R2 0.2654 0.1940 0.2502 0.0986 0.1314 0.1421 0.0977 0.1276 0.3943 0.2062 0.1929 0.0936 
 
Notes: All models are cross section and also contain 37 age/gender bands, 152 ICD10 morbidity dummies for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  4 hospital encounter variables for 2006/7, 
2005/6, 2 private patient measures for 2006/7 and 2005/6,  5 attributed needs variables, and 151 PCT dummies. See Sections 2 and 3 for details.  The R2 is a pseudo-R-
squared for the probit models. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 Table 9. Panel data models for patient hospital costs 2004/5 - 2007/8  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
fixed practice 
effects 
random 
practice 
effects 
random 
practice 
effects 
random 
practice 
effects 
random 
practice 
effects 
random 
practice 
effects 
random 
practice 
effects 
 all costs all costs all costs all costs 
emergency 
costs only 
elective costs 
only 
outpatient 
costs only 
stroke QOF score  -0.091 -0.193** -0.266** -0.255** -0.245*** 0.072 -0.058** 
[0.135] [0.085] [0.117] [0.117] [0.078] [0.065] [0.026] 
   
lagged individual cost 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.053*** 0.205*** 0.558*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.011] [0.030] 
   
base individual cost 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.046*** 0.013 0.088*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.011] [0.015] 
   
base practice cost 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.023** 0.105*** 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] 
   
Observations (NT) 19,701,431 19,701,431 14,590,999 14,590,999 14,590,999 14,590,999 14,590,999 
Individuals (N) 5,123,157 5,123,157 5,005,347 5,005,347 5,005,347 5,005,347 5,005,347 
   
Within R2 0.2047 0.2031 0.2091 0.2091 0.0691 0.2825 0.2937 
Between R2 n/a 0.7414 0.7007 0.7006 0.5508 0.6644 0.8632 
Overall R2 n/a 0.2043 0.2103 0.2103 0.0699 0.2832 0.2979 
Note:  The dependent variable in all models is individual hospital cost in a year.  Model 1 is a fixed (practice) effects model with robust standard errors clustered by general 
practice. Model 2 is a random (practice) effects model with robust standard errors clustered by practice.  Model 3 is the same as model 2 with the addition of lagged 
individual cost and baseline individual cost.  Model 4 is the same as model 3 with the addition of baseline practice cost.  Models 5 – 7 are the same as model 4 but employ a 
different measure of cost as the dependent variable and as regressors.  All models also contain 37 age/gender bands, 152 ICD10 morbidity dummies, 4 hospital encounter 
variables, 2 private patient measures,  5 attributed needs variables, 3 year dummies and 151 PCT dummies. See Sections 2 and 3 for details. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A1: Summary of modelling results   
Table A1 Determinants of individual hospital costs 
One period 
cross-
section 
model, 
2007/8 
Panel data models, 2004/5-2007/8 
OLS 
Fixed 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
Random 
practice 
effects 
all costs all costs all costs all costs all costs 
emergency 
costs only 
elective 
costs only 
outpatient 
costs only 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Demographic variables                 
males aged < 1 197.419*** 165.777*** 166.433*** 
[17.287] [13.691] [13.684] 
males aged 1-4 -2.405 -10.080*** -9.873*** -8.601** -8.597** -14.991*** -8.546*** 7.524*** 
[5.080] [3.098] [3.095] [3.685] [3.685] [2.757] [1.861] [0.982] 
males aged 5-9 -20.949*** -20.829*** -20.425*** -22.129*** -22.191*** -12.320*** -13.768*** 1.802** 
[3.789] [2.104] [2.100] [2.285] [2.285] [1.334] [1.314] [0.747] 
males aged 10-14 -2.121 -2.398 -2.105 -5.412** -5.518** -1.553 -16.942*** 8.937*** 
[3.087] [2.027] [2.021] [2.272] [2.272] [1.387] [1.310] [0.771] 
males aged 15-19 -9.816*** -10.526*** -10.257*** -12.963*** -13.087*** 5.582*** -14.648*** -4.961*** 
[3.654] [2.248] [2.239] [2.491] [2.492] [1.590] [1.326] [0.555] 
males aged 20-24 -12.602*** -10.898*** -11.892*** -10.279*** -9.817*** 2.200 -7.905*** -3.775*** 
[3.648] [2.123] [2.111] [2.409] [2.407] [1.500] [1.276] [0.625] 
males aged 25-29 -18.198*** -17.334*** -17.447*** -16.983*** -16.686*** -4.240*** -6.617*** -4.658*** 
[3.380] [2.073] [2.067] [2.357] [2.356] [1.486] [1.343] [0.545] 
males aged 30-34 -14.297*** -15.341*** -15.332*** -15.034*** -14.917*** -5.988*** -3.073** -3.663*** 
[3.352] [2.016] [2.010] [2.311] [2.310] [1.394] [1.453] [0.557] 
males aged 40-44 17.037*** 17.991*** 18.358*** 18.861*** 18.781*** 5.793*** 6.443*** 4.049*** 
[3.874] [2.264] [2.261] [2.604] [2.605] [1.623] [1.556] [0.611] 
males aged 45-49 51.812*** 47.238*** 47.569*** 45.639*** 45.523*** 14.678*** 16.739*** 9.311*** 
[4.568] [2.605] [2.603] [2.945] [2.945] [1.821] [1.682] [0.620] 
males aged 50-54 97.534*** 86.394*** 86.492*** 86.698*** 86.532*** 24.956*** 35.819*** 17.243*** 
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[5.971] [3.010] [3.007] [3.435] [3.435] [2.082] [2.078] [0.750] 
males aged 55-59 158.800*** 158.851*** 159.115*** 158.972*** 158.763*** 44.319*** 73.653*** 28.233*** 
[5.513] [3.378] [3.376] [3.860] [3.860] [2.382] [2.397] [0.757] 
males aged 60-64 256.885*** 257.573*** 257.563*** 253.905*** 253.651*** 75.854*** 114.211*** 43.510*** 
[7.790] [4.201] [4.199] [4.812] [4.813] [3.030] [2.961] [0.964] 
males aged 65-69 372.892*** 388.696*** 388.242*** 384.364*** 384.076*** 122.706*** 170.182*** 60.646*** 
[10.292] [5.628] [5.627] [6.359] [6.358] [3.900] [4.186] [1.059] 
males aged 70-74 543.605*** 554.111*** 553.779*** 544.812*** 544.476*** 217.906*** 209.371*** 77.231*** 
[10.572] [6.862] [6.858] [7.874] [7.872] [5.170] [4.778] [1.256] 
males aged 75-79 665.427*** 723.810*** 723.210*** 719.482*** 719.098*** 354.787*** 227.876*** 88.193*** 
[17.597] [8.466] [8.462] [9.880] [9.881] [6.807] [5.785] [1.445] 
males aged 80-84 849.446*** 893.550*** 892.651*** 899.530*** 899.111*** 580.771*** 186.437*** 80.618*** 
[21.208] [11.342] [11.345] [13.266] [13.265] [9.437] [7.498] [1.521] 
males aged over 85 1,054.627*** 1,100.922*** 1,100.030*** 1,110.798*** 1,110.323*** 904.912*** 95.547*** 53.821*** 
[26.048] [13.845] [13.847] [15.887] [15.889] [13.320] [6.495] [1.510] 
females aged < 1 138.289*** 99.636*** 100.181*** 
[15.358] [12.828] [12.838] 
females aged 1-4 -25.905*** -30.018*** -29.581*** -25.498*** -25.526*** -20.387*** -11.985*** 2.534*** 
[4.524] [2.540] [2.532] [3.083] [3.083] [2.039] [1.624] [0.826] 
females aged 5-9 -26.827*** -28.287*** -27.892*** -28.225*** -28.286*** -13.132*** -15.420*** -1.287* 
[3.196] [1.994] [1.986] [2.294] [2.294] [1.413] [1.233] [0.659] 
females aged 10-14 -3.985 -6.166*** -5.632*** -7.875*** -7.994*** -4.513*** -12.549*** 6.306*** 
[3.801] [2.038] [2.034] [2.325] [2.325] [1.415] [1.414] [0.731] 
females aged 15-19 -6.266** -6.412*** -6.346*** -7.919*** -8.042*** 2.209 -11.180*** 0.708 
[3.074] [2.053] [2.046] [2.354] [2.355] [1.549] [1.314] [0.598] 
females aged 20-24 -2.239 -2.425 -3.145 -1.105 -0.539 -2.968* -7.755*** 9.028*** 
[3.564] [2.103] [2.092] [2.418] [2.412] [1.548] [1.425] [0.587] 
females aged 25-29 6.534* 8.078*** 7.911*** 7.637*** 7.858*** -6.935*** -0.321 12.955*** 
[3.594] [2.124] [2.119] [2.419] [2.418] [1.434] [1.409] [0.604] 
females aged 30-34 27.344*** 27.337*** 27.349*** 24.292*** 24.379*** -4.888*** 9.986*** 16.456*** 
[3.796] [2.112] [2.110] [2.430] [2.429] [1.501] [1.392] [0.612] 
females aged 35-39 42.123*** 41.957*** 42.325*** 39.431*** 39.393*** -3.267* 22.277*** 19.733*** 
[3.740] [2.339] [2.334] [2.671] [2.671] [1.784] [1.571] [0.661] 
females aged 40-44 55.333*** 48.340*** 48.722*** 47.460*** 47.352*** -5.639*** 30.240*** 21.491*** 
[4.127] [2.246] [2.242] [2.560] [2.561] [1.544] [1.555] [0.670] 
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females aged 45-49 83.608*** 72.951*** 73.269*** 72.187*** 72.054*** -2.246 43.298*** 27.910*** 
[5.256] [2.587] [2.580] [2.934] [2.934] [1.791] [1.759] [0.759] 
females aged 50-54 116.499*** 99.410*** 99.756*** 100.411*** 100.230*** 3.494* 58.210*** 32.986*** 
[5.475] [2.815] [2.811] [3.258] [3.259] [1.983] [2.037] [0.807] 
females aged 55-59 145.882*** 138.527*** 138.764*** 136.996*** 136.774*** 12.848*** 76.963*** 39.512*** 
[5.613] [3.125] [3.119] [3.515] [3.515] [1.994] [2.254] [0.869] 
females aged 60-64 210.316*** 204.924*** 205.115*** 201.209*** 200.934*** 35.906*** 106.441*** 46.661*** 
[7.340] [3.824] [3.826] [4.287] [4.289] [2.599] [2.621] [0.927] 
females aged 65-69 305.235*** 313.520*** 313.356*** 313.155*** 312.824*** 90.045*** 143.013*** 59.600*** 
[8.924] [4.843] [4.840] [5.541] [5.542] [3.592] [3.319] [1.126] 
females aged 70-74 442.255*** 437.202*** 436.949*** 428.955*** 428.588*** 169.465*** 168.990*** 65.578*** 
[11.018] [5.461] [5.454] [6.295] [6.297] [4.114] [3.871] [1.073] 
females aged 75-79 577.341*** 602.705*** 602.174*** 596.728*** 596.318*** 315.451*** 171.712*** 70.522*** 
[12.413] [6.625] [6.620] [7.800] [7.799] [5.323] [4.575] [1.179] 
females aged 80-84 730.523*** 781.650*** 780.755*** 782.183*** 781.752*** 541.031*** 127.826*** 65.061*** 
[13.866] [7.722] [7.720] [9.122] [9.126] [7.160] [4.230] [1.409] 
females aged over 85 984.768*** 1,059.716*** 1,058.386*** 1,064.372*** 1,063.915*** 882.623*** 77.182*** 35.239*** 
[19.499] [9.295] [9.296] [10.811] [10.812] [8.885] [4.638] [1.095] 
Past hospital encounters 
number of episodes 298.628*** 288.928*** 289.002*** 242.669*** 242.669*** 11.823*** 201.800*** 1.842*** 
[9.938] [4.285] [4.283] [4.081] [4.081] [0.828] [4.328] [0.368] 
number attendances 45.712*** 49.476*** 49.577*** 41.021*** 41.011*** 8.507*** 9.144*** 0.719 
[2.211] [0.593] [0.592] [0.661] [0.661] [0.269] [0.344] [1.254] 
Outpatient priority referral 70.965*** 107.030*** 106.849*** 85.185*** 85.106*** 16.132*** 55.142*** -13.782*** 
[10.590] [3.463] [3.461] [3.659] [3.659] [2.160] [2.155] [1.907] 
Outpatient treatment 55.845*** 37.174*** 36.742*** 27.134*** 27.113*** -19.191*** 40.612*** -8.695*** 
[12.415] [4.790] [4.766] [5.050] [5.050] [3.047] [3.234] [1.488] 
Past private hospital use 
private attendance  -168.255*** -137.481*** -138.798*** -122.626*** -122.523*** -36.251*** -47.655*** 14.103*** 
[25.153] [13.234] [13.240] [13.795] [13.797] [8.641] [8.464] [3.438] 
private episodes -491.478*** -468.248*** -470.636*** -345.384*** -345.360*** 
-
165.139*** 
-
114.463*** -15.185*** 
[24.625] [15.506] [15.525] [18.348] [18.348] [11.119] [12.090] [2.378] 
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Year dummies 
year 2 dummy -24.113*** -23.705*** 27.542*** 27.597*** 26.034*** 1.428 -4.613*** 
[1.446] [1.361] [1.571] [1.571] [0.997] [0.876] [0.396] 
year 3 dummy -21.033*** -20.064*** 32.412*** 32.408*** 28.676*** 4.545*** -3.743*** 
[2.105] [1.796] [1.621] [1.621] [1.055] [0.877] [0.329] 
year 4 dummy -55.337*** -54.373*** 
[1.970] [1.611] 
Attributed needs variables 
in social rented housing 0.342*** 0.306*** 0.347*** 0.386*** 0.407*** 0.356*** -0.005 0.042*** 
[0.101] [0.056] [0.049] [0.056] [0.056] [0.037] [0.032] [0.010] 
disability living allowance 292.772*** 433.599*** 413.832*** 432.916*** 410.730*** 331.005*** 39.095 37.276*** 
[79.592] [48.667] [43.526] [50.657] [50.870] [33.458] [28.855] [8.488] 
no qualifications standardised 23.136*** 19.466*** 20.080*** 18.025*** 17.209*** 7.307*** 5.037*** 1.865*** 
[4.836] [3.383] [2.779] [3.198] [3.200] [2.087] [1.927] [0.487] 
ONS 15: City professionals  -22.845*** 2.345 -4.329 -1.020 -0.410 4.507 2.253 -3.615** 
[7.027] [5.477] [4.980] [5.838] [5.826] [3.694] [3.497] [1.509] 
students in population -1,254.64*** -1,302.84*** -1,315.06*** -1,329.76*** -1,324.40*** -622.02*** -470.47*** -185.95*** 
[138.77] [95.26] [84.15] [97.29] [97.31] [62.90] [55.31] [16.88] 
Disease management
stroke QOF score -0.664*** -0.090 -0.193** -0.266** -0.255** -0.245*** 0.072 -0.058** 
[0.190] [0.135] [0.085] [0.117] [0.117] [0.078] [0.065] [0.026] 
Lagged cost variables 
lagged one period individual cost 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.053*** 0.205*** 0.558*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.011] [0.030] 
base period individual cost 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.046*** 0.013 0.088*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.011] [0.015] 
base period practice cost 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.023** 0.105*** 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] 
Constant 130.476*** 72.433*** 112.274*** 88.511*** 76.304*** 23.638** 28.715*** 23.741*** 
[17.584] [10.881] [10.039] [13.788] [13.882] [9.981] [8.037] [2.637] 
40 
 
Robust standard errors in 
brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  The dependent variable in all models is individual hospital cost in a year.  Model 1 is a one period cross-section OLS model with robust standard errors.  Model 2 is a 
fixed (practice) effects model with robust standard errors clustered by general practice. Model 3 is a random (practice) effects model with robust standard errors clustered by 
practice.  Model 4 is the same as model 3 with the addition of lagged individual cost and base period individual cost.  Model 5 is the same as model 4 with the addition of 
baseline practice cost.  Models 6 – 8 are the same as model 5 but employ a different measure of cost as the dependent variable and as regressors.  All models also contain 152 
ICD10 morbidity dummies and 151 PCT dummies. See Sections 2 and 3 for details. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Full results are in the Working Paper (Dusheiko et al, 
2011). 
 
  
